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Abstract
The Bulgarian Orthodox Church-Bulgarian Patriarchate is conventionally associated with the
Bulgarian national identity, statehood, and culture. Recognizing its contribution for their
preservation, the state has ensured certain privileges to the Church, including regulation of its
legal status. During the Bulgarian monarchy (1878-1944) and under the 1879 Tarnovo
Constitution, Eastern Orthodoxy had been recognized as the official religion of the state
(Art. 37), and religion was present in the public schools, the army, and the public sphere in
general. After the fall of the totalitarian communist regime, in the new democratic 1991
Constitution, Eastern Orthodoxy was recognized as the traditional religion in the state,
without explicitly providing specific privileges. In the last decades, however, the public role
and influence of the Church has been increasing. Starting with the government of Simeon
Saxe-Coburg-Gotha (2001-2005) and the adoption of new 2002 Denominations Act, and
continuing during the terms of Borisov’s three governments (2009-2020), church-state
relations have developed to the point that the state takes increasing responsibility for the
well-being of the Church (from ensuring public funding for reconstruction and maintenance
of churches to paying salaries of clergy). This new approach to church-state relations will be
analyzed, thus raising questions whether it remains within the initial constitutional frame or
tacitly shapes and gradually recognizes a new official religion status of the Church vis-à-vis
the state and society.
Key words: traditional religion, church-state relations, official religion status, Bulgarian
Patriarchate, 1991 Constitution, 2002 Denominations Act
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1.Bulgarian Orthodox Church during Democratization (1990s): Political Context and
Public Presence
The specific public law status of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church (BOC) and Eastern
Orthodoxy as traditional religion was negotiated in the first years of democratization. It was
first legally formulated with the adoption of the democratic 1991 Constitution. This status
reflected the historical role of the BOC for preserving and cultivating Bulgarian national
identity and culture. The practical dimensions of this status, however, were shaped by the
overall social and political context, and the complex interplay between different political,
religious, governmental, and social actors.
The public presence of the BOC in the first years after 1989 suffered from several
constraints: first, the heavy legacy of collaboration of the high-ranked clergy with the regime
between 1945 and 1990, especially with international socialist initiatives (i.e., the
international peace movement of the socialist countries). This collaboration was initially
present in nationalist propaganda during the infamous “Revival Process” 1 against the
Bulgarian Muslim minority. Secondly, the involvement of members of the Holy Synod in the
communist secret services had in turn weakened their legitimacy among believers.2 Thirdly,
the internal tensions within the Holy Synod and the division among its members leading to
the creation of an alternative church governance (the Alternative Synod) of metropolitans
(from 1992 to 1998 with some consequences lasting until 2004).3 All these conditions have
contributed to the problematic public image of the church in the first years of democratic

transition.

1

This process („Възродителен процес“ in Bulgarian) planned and implemented in the last decade of the
communist regime, included official state-mandated oppressive measures as forceful renaming of Bulgarian
Muslims (giving them Bulgarian names), jailing of opponents, mass shooting against protesters, compulsory
eviction from property, forced expulsion to Turkey, etc.:
https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p0509h7n
(released 24 April 2017). Михаил Груев, Алексей Кальонски, „Възродителният процес“.
Мюсюлманските общности и комунистическият режим: политики, реакции, и последици (София:
ИИБМ, СИЕЛА, 2008) [Michail Gruev, Aleksei Kalionski, “The Revival Process”. Muslim Communities and
the Communist Regime: Polices, Reactions , and Consequences (Sofia: ISRP, CIELA, 2008)]
2
Момчил Методиев, Между вярата и компромиса. Българската православна църква и комунистическата
държава 1944-1989 [Momchil Metodiev, Between Faith and Compromise. The Orthodox Church and the
Communist State in Bulgaria 1944-1989] (Sofia: CIELA, 2010).
3
James Lindsay Hopkins, The Bulgarian Orthodox Church: A Socio-Historical Analysis of the Evolving
Relationship between Church, Nation, and State in Bulgaria (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 2008),
Ch.7.; Spas Raikin, “The Schism in the BOC, 1992-1997”, in: J. D. Bell (ed.) Bulgaria in Transition (Boulder,
CO: 1998).
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In the first decade after the democratic breakthrough in the early 1990s, the public
presence of the Church was significantly affected by the ongoing internal division between
the Holy Synod chaired by the Patriarch and the Alternative Synod. These divisions were
fueled by the deep running political division between former communists and new
democrats; the former established good relations and support for the Patriarch, and
metropolitans sided with him, while the latter endorsed the alternative group.4
Significant steps towards reunification of the two groups have been made during the panOrthodox Church Council convened in Sofia between 30th of September and 1st of October
in 1998, chaired by the Ecumenical Patriarch. The council was attended by six patriarchs (of
Alexandria, Antioch, Russia, Serbia, Romania, and Bulgaria), as well as by representatives of
the other autocephalous Orthodox countries. Its session concluded with the publicly
announced return of the majority of the clergy of the Alternative Synod in communion with
the recognized Bulgarian Patriarchate.5
The governmental and political involvement in the internal church issues led to litigation

cases before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). Members of the Alternative
Synod claimed violation of their freedom of religion under Art. 9 of the European
Convention on Human Rights, citing forceful eviction from their churches in 2004 and the
imposed restraints in exercising their religious practices. The Court ruled against the country,
reasoning that the Bulgarian authorities overstepped the boundaries of non-involvement in
denominational disputes. Furthermore, the existing legislation does not fully protect the free
exercise of religion in accordance with the principles and standards of Art. 9 of the European
Convention. Thus, in its 2009 judgement, the Court decided that the country has to
compensate a group of Orthodox Christians, led by Metropolitan Inokentiy of the
“Alternative Synod”.6

4

Janice Broun, “The Schism in the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, Part 3: Under the Second Union of Democratic
Forces Government, 1997-2001” (2002) 30 Religion, State & Society 4, 365-394
5
Ibid.
6
For legally significant interpretation of facts, see the ECtHR judgment: Holy Synod of the Bulgarian Orthodox
Church (Metropolitan Inokentiy) and Others v. Bulgaria, no. 412/03; 35677/04, Judgment of 22 January 2009§§ 14-49; §§ 159, 160.
‘The Court finds that while the leadership dispute in the Bulgarian Orthodox Church was a source of
legitimate concern for the State authorities, their intervention was disproportionate. In particular, the pertinent
provisions of the 2002 Act, which did not meet the Convention standard of quality of the law, and their
implementation through sweeping measures forcing the community to unite under the leadership favoured by
the Government went beyond any legitimate aim and interfered with the organizational autonomy of the Church
and the applicants’ rights under Article 9 of the Convention in a manner which cannot be accepted as lawful and
necessary in a democratic society, despite the wide margin of appreciation left to the national authorities.’
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Contrary to the prevailing public expectation in the early 1990s that the Church would
vocally support the process of democratic political change, with the exception of some high
clergy and some parish priests, the Holy Synod remained rather silent on political issues. One
of the reasons for this lack of public engagement is the role played by the members of the
Synod during the last decades of the communist regime. During an official process of
disclosure of secret files of agents and informants of the former communist State Security
service, it was discovered that the majority of the metropolitans and bishops were co-opted
by the regime at an early stage of their ecclesiastic careers, and they were elected for high
church offices with the aid of secret services. In 2012, the independent commission dealing
with disclosures of the files announced that more than two-thirds of the members of the
Synod had been recruited as secret service agents (11 out of 15 metropolitans). Consequently,
their public legitimacy had been eroded and the polls measured a significant decrease of the
public trust in the church (from above 55% to around 40%). Nonetheless, after the election
and enthronement of the new Bulgarian Patriarch Neophite in February 2013 and

simultaneous replacement of some older metropolitans with younger bishops (non-related to
the communist regime), the public trust in the church increased to above 60% in 2013 and
remained relatively high in the consecutive years (oscillating around 50%).7
In providing an objective evaluation of the public presence of the church, it should be
taken into account that for the last two decades, the Bulgarian society has remained extremely
secularized, lacking the basic knowledge of the Christian faith, symbols, and rituals. There
should be no doubt that the high percentage of people (almost 60 % of the population of 7
million) declaring themselves Orthodox Christians

can be attributed to the traditional

overlapping between national identity and religious affiliation, as accepted by the majority of
the population.8
2. Eastern Orthodoxy as “Traditional religion”: The Bulgarian Situation in Context
After the first democratic elections in June 1990, some members of the Holy Synod and
the lower clergy were elected representatives in the constituent assembly (Grand National
7

National Center for the Study of Public Opinion, March 2013 Survey: http://dveri.bg/xu8u3 (accessed
10.05.2020). Trust in the Church survey 2019 (published 21.08.2019): https://www.gallupinternational.bg/en/42495/30-years-after/ (accessed 10.05.2020)
8
According to the last national census in 2011 the statistics reads as follows: 4 374 135 out 7 364 570 citizens
declared their religion as Eastern Orthodox Christianity. However, the percentage of people which regularly
attend religious services and actively participate in the religious life of their community is much lower (around
10 %): http://censusresults.nsi.bg/Census/Reports/2/2/R10.aspx (viewed 12.05.2020).
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Assembly). Their participation in the constitutional debates was recognizable, attempting to
obtain certain rights and privileges for the BOC. The constitutional formula that was
introduced in the new democratic constitution defined the role of the Eastern Orthodoxy in
the society as traditional religion: “Eastern Orthodox Christianity shall be considered the
traditional religion in the Republic of Bulgaria” (Art.13, 3). With this provision, it is only
acknowledged that Eastern Orthodoxy is the religion of the majority of the population and it
has existed for a long period of time. This constitutional provision does not secure any
specific privileged position for the church, though the practices that have emerged and the
subsequent legislation have moved in this direction. In line with the prevailing liberal and
democratic character of the 1991 Constitution, it provides for church-state separation (Art.
13, 2), as well as guarantees the freedom of religion and its free exercise (Art. 37). A
specified provision bans the use of religious institutions, communities, and beliefs for
political ends (Art. 13, 4), thus limiting the possibility for religiously motivated political
extremism.9

It should be pointed out that the term ‘traditional religion’ conceptually differs from
“official or state religion” in that it does not confer or protect any specific privileges,
especially if compared to other traditional Orthodox jurisdictions, such as Greece, Cyprus, or
Romania.

Greece
In Greece the official state status of the Church of Greece is constitutionally entrenched
in the Article 3 of the 1975 Constitution, stipulating as follows:
The prevailing religion in Greece is that of the Eastern Orthodox Church of Christ. The
Orthodox Church of Greece, acknowledging our Lord Jesus Christ as its head, is inseparably
united in doctrine with the Great Church of Christ in Constantinople and with every other
Church of Christ of the same doctrine, observing unwaveringly, as they do, the holy apostolic
and synodal canons and sacred traditions. It is autocephalous and is administered by the Holy
Synod of serving Bishops and the Permanent Holy Synod…
The preamble of the Constitution consists of a direct invocation of the Holy Trinity in the
Orthodox dogmatic formula: ‘in the name of the holy, consubstantial and indivisible Trinity.’

Moreover, it is noteworthy that the section of church-state relations is placed at the
second position in the Greek Constitution, after the section on the form of government; the

9

Ina Merdjanova, Religion, Nationalism, and Civil Society in Eastern Europe. The Postcommunist Palimspest
(Lewiston, NY: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2002), pp. 12-13.
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Church also enjoys a specific constitutional recognition of its function as a protector of the
text of the Holy Scriptures: ‘The text of the Holy Scripture shall be maintained unaltered.
Official translation of the text into any other form of language, without prior sanction by the
Autocephalous Church of Greece and the Great Church of Christ in Constantinople, is
prohibited.’ To the special privileges accorded to the Greek Church are the participation of
high clergy during official ceremonies of solemn oaths taken by the president, PMs and
ministers invoking the name of the Holy and Consubstantial and Indivisible Trinity (Art. 33,
par. 2; Art. 59).10 The constitutional protection of the Church is further ensured: there is a
prohibition of proselytism, which in fact limits the scope of religious activity of nonOrthodox denominations, despite the constitutional guarantee of the freedom of religion in
Article 13. Even in the sphere of public education, there is a constitutional obligation for the
state to be committed to nurturing the national and religious conscience of the Greek people
(Art. 16, 2), hence to recognize and support the role of the Church and Orthodox Christianity
in society. This general constitutional provision is used as a legal foundation of the daily

prayers at schools.11
The strong connections between the state and the church are further revealed in the
public sphere: many national holidays coincide with the most celebrated religious feasts; the
state continues to pay the salaries of the Orthodox clergy, which enjoy the de facto status of
civil servants;12 metropolitans are appointed by the president on the proposal of the Holy
Synod of the Church of Greece. This mode of church-state relations is often defined by
scholars of religion and politics as sunallelia (“being together”).13
Beyond its protected constitutional status, in the Greek Church two tendencies often
collide: the one is focused on nationalism and nation-state while it opposes globalization and
modernity; the other emphasizes the universality of the Christian faith and the church’s
mission, addressing positively the process of democratization and globalization.14
10

Respecting the freedom of religion and conscience, there is an opportunity for non-religious ceremony.
Evangelos Karagiannis, “Secularism in Context: The Relations between the Greek State and the Church of
Greece in Crisis” (2009) Arch. europ. sociol., L, 1, pp. 133–167, 146.
12
Though there were considerations and plans in the opposite direction during the final year of Alexis Tsipras
government, however, in 2019 the New Democracy government agreed to continue the established practice:
Greek conservatives scrap plans to take clergy off state payroll, Reuters, July 16, 2019:
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-greece-church/greek-conservatives-scrap-plans-to-take-clergy-off-statepayroll-idUSKCN1UB1IW (visited 12.05.2020).
13
Basilius J. Groen, “Nationalism and Reconciliation: Orthodoxy in the Balkans” (1998) 26 Religion, State &
Society 2, pp. 116 -118.
14
Victor Roudometoff, “Greek Orthodoxy, Territoriality, and Globality: Religious Responses and Institutional
Disputes’ (2008) 68 Sociology of Religion 1, pp. 67-91, 71-72.
11
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Romania
In the 1991 Constitution of Romania, alongside the provisions on the freedom of religion,
the autonomy of religious denominations from the state is safeguarded. The right of religious
institutions to receive support from the state for its public presence and social mission is also
guaranteed (“including the facilitation of religious assistance in the army, in hospitals, prison,
homes and orphanages”–Art. 29, 5).15 It is noteworthy that the religious denomination which
mostly benefited from this constitutional provision is the Romanian Orthodox Church as the
predominant religion in the country. The public presence of religion is also visible in the
official state ceremonies–for instance, in the presidential inauguration ceremony, of taking
constitutional oath by the president during inauguration ends with the solemn formula of
invocation of God (“So help me God!” - Art. 82, 2).
This constitutional regulation, based on the principles of autonomy and cooperation
between the state and religious communities, has been affirmed after a heated debate on the

role of the Romanian Orthodox Church. The church’s claims had emphasized its traditional
role as a national church with significant contributions to the formation of the Romanian
nation. Though not all groups in the society agreed with such exclusivist claims, the church
had attempted to influence the legislation in its own favor.
In December 2006, the new Law on Religious Freedom was adopted, securing to some
extent the privileged position of the Romanian Church. The law specified the state’s
recognition of the “important role of the Romanian Orthodox Church” as well as the role of
“other churches and denominations as recognized by the national history” of the country.16
Provisions in the law limit religious proselytizing. They are deemed highly restrictive by
religious minorities (some Evangelical Christian denominations) and independent
international observers. Questions in regard to other restrictive and discriminatory clauses of
the law have been raised, though they have remained not properly addressed by Romanian
institutions. Some of the controversial provisions include restrictive requirements for
religious associations on eligibility for state support; for instance, religious institutions are
ineligible to be considered for the preferential status of religious denomination until they

have reached their twelfth year of practice in the country. Additionally, the state required
15

Merdjanova, Religion, Nationalism, and Civil Society in Eastern Europe, pp.15-26.
International Religious Freedom Report 2018 Romania, US Department of State, Bureau of Democracy,
Human Rights, and Labor: https://www.state.gov/reports/2018-report-on-international-religiousfreedom/romania/ (visited 12.05.2020)
16
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their membership to represent and maintain a membership minimum of0. 1% of the
population. Other restrictions include limits on certain forms of the freedom of expression
and free speech, which are considered violating established religious symbols (Art. 13 of the
Law).17
The US Department of State in its annual report on religious freedom assesses the current
situation in Romania with respect to the legal framework and existing practices. It was
emphasized that registered religious denominations (the preferential status is limited to only
18 religious organizations) are eligible for state financial and other support. They have the
right to teach religion classes in public schools, receive government funds to build places of
worship, partially pay clergy salaries with state funds, broadcast religious programming on
radio and television, and apply for broadcasting licenses for their own stations. Under the
law, the amount of state funding a denomination receives is determined by the number of
adherents reported in the most recent census, as well as by “the religious denomination’s
actual needs.” Furthermore, legal provisions allow local authorities to provide additional

support and funding for religious denominations. Local authorities may legally fund places of
worship and theological schools belonging to religious denominations, including providing
funding for staff salaries and building maintenance, renovation, and conservation or
construction of places of worship. Sharp differentiation between the privileged status of the
predominant Orthodox Church and religious minorities--especially those not recognized as
denominations, but simply as religious associations or other civil associations engaged in
religious activities--raises justified criticisms of existing discriminatory practices with respect
to their treatment on behalf of the public authorities.18
The Romanian Orthodox Church continues to play an important role in the public sphere.
On numerous occasions, the Church has successfully influenced the legislation (e.g. in the
field of religious education in the public schools); it has addressed the public opinion on
important issues of bio-ethics (on abortion and euthanasia) and public morals (against
legalization of homosexuality); politicians regularly seek support for their public campaigns
by the church leadership and promise to defend their agenda in the decision-making
process.19
17

Cristian Romocea, Church and State: Religious Nationalism and State Identification in Post-Communist
Romania (London: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2011), pp. 33-34.
18
International Religious Freedom Report 2018 Romania
19
Lavinia Stan, Lucian Turcescu, Church, State and Democracy in Expanding Europe (New York: OUP,
2011), pp. 148-149.
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***
Such privileged treatment for the predominant religion could not be found in the
constitutional status of Eastern Orthodoxy as “traditional religion” in Bulgaria. In the
constitutional provision (Art. 13, 2) the Bulgarian Orthodox Church per se is not even
mentioned. Hence, it would be improper to claim there is an establishment clause on
constitutional level that provides special protection of the Church. The impression, however,
changes when one turns to the legislation and the dominant practice.
The current law on religious organizations (Denominations Act) was adopted in 2002 in
attempt to modernize the existing legal framework on religious entities and to provide
legislative protection of the Bulgarian Patriarchate weakened by internal division and the rise
of a movement (Alternative Synod) which for some time enjoyed governmental support
(1997-2001). The government of Simeon Saxe-Coburg-Gotha (2001-2005)20 developed very
good relations with the Patriarchate and took steps to strengthen the position of the officially
and canonically recognized Holy Synod, vis-à-vis the remnants of the Alternative Synod.

Thus, the new law has established a privileged role of the Bulgarian Patriarchate including
special ex lege recognition of its legal personality (there is no need to register as a religious
institution with the court register as is required for other denominations).
The preamble of the 2002 law is also indicative of the general principles and objectives of
the subsequent normative regulations. First, the freedom of religion and equality before the
law is proclaimed for all persons, regardless of their religious convictions. Second, the
“traditional role” of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church in the history of the country and in the
development of its culture and spirituality is emphasized. Third, the preamble states that
legislators pay due respect to Christianity, Islam, Judaism, and other religions, while
supporting mutual understanding, tolerance, and respect among them.
At this point it is important to note that there is a deliberate twist in the legislative
formula, which maintains constitutional protection of Eastern Orthodoxy as ‘traditional
religion.’ This is legislatively interpreted and implemented as ‘traditional role’ of the
Bulgarian Orthodox Church, which–in the specific provisions–is clearly defined as the
Bulgarian Patriarchate, thus outlawing other pretenders like the Alternative Synod and other

rival groups.

20

Simeon Saxe-Coburg-Gotha is the former Bulgarian monarch who ruled with Regency (1943-1946) after the
unexpected death of his father, Tzar Boris III in August 1943. Simeon returned in Bulgaria after decades of exile
and won the parliamentary elections in 2001, and was elected prime-minister by the Bulgarian parliament.
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Furthermore, several provisions of the new law restate the principles laid down in the
constitution. Freedom of religion, along with the principle of separation between religious
institutions and the state and the prohibition of any form of discrimination on the ground of
religion are stipulated (Art. 1 to Art. 4 of the law).
The role of the Eastern Orthodoxy for the state and society is further defined (Art. 10)
along with its traditional character. It is stated that Orthodoxy has “a historical role for the
Bulgarian state and actual meaning for its state life.” Moreover, the law stipulates that
Eastern Orthodoxy is represented by the self-ruling (autocephalous) Bulgarian Orthodox
Church-Bulgarian Patriarchate, which is the legitimate successor of the Bulgarian Exarchate
and a member of the One, Holy, Catholic, and Apostolic Church. It is governed by the Holy
Synod and is represented by the Bulgarian Patriarch. It is also provided that the Bulgarian
Church has a legal personality established by the law, while its structure and governance are
laid down in its statute. As a preventive measure against future divisions, the law prohibits
persons and groups who seceded from a registered religious institution to use the same name

as new legal entity or the property and assets of the original religious institution. Practically,
it means there cannot be established legally a second religious institution named the
Bulgarian Orthodox Church, even without claims of a patriarchal dignity and form of
governance. This entrenchment and protective clause in a 2010 judgement of the ECtHR was
found as contradicting the standards of the European Convention.21

3. Elevation of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church To De Facto Official Religion Status
In the last decade, the increased public presence of the Church and the governmental
support for its initiatives raise questions of whether there is ongoing change in its status in
society that will be followed by legislative intervention. This tendency in no way challenges
what Ina Merdjanova has called “the neo-secularization” of Bulgarian society under the

21

However, the ECtHR has considered the 2002 law to be in collision with the standards of the Convention:
Holy Synod of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church (Metropolitan Inokentiy) and Others v. Bulgaria (Just
Satisfaction Judgment), no. 412/03; 35677/04, Judgment of 16 September 2010, § 49:
‘In the Court's view, the 2002 Act did not meet the Convention standards of quality of the law, in so far
as its provisions disregarded the fact that the Bulgarian Orthodox Church was deeply divided and left open to
arbitrary interpretation the issue of legal representation of the Church ... Moreover, although the ex lege
recognition of the Church cannot be seen as incompatible with Article 9 in principle, its introduction in a time of
deep division was tantamount to forcing the believers to accept a single leadership against their will. Those
provisions of the 2002 Act–still in force continue to generate legal uncertainty, as it can be seen from the
contradictory judicial decisions that have been adopted and the events that have unfolded since the Act's entry
into force ...’.
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conditions of globalization and liberal political and social reforms. As Merdjanova has
observed,
In Bulgarian society, Orthodox Christianity has remained an important aspect and a
marker of national identity, and thereby has retained its public visibility. Yet it does not
have a substantial impact on the worldviews and behavior of those citizens who define
themselves as Orthodox. Neo-secularization in Bulgaria is not a reincarnation of the
communist secularization, even though the historic legacies of a pervasive atheist
ideology and practice cannot be discounted. It is rooted in new sociopolitical conditions
related to globalization and the neoliberal paradigm, which reinforce and perpetuate the
prevalence of individualistic discursive practices and erode communal bonding.22
On the one hand, it is the increased activity of the Church that attracts public attention.
The Holy Synod’s official statements, however, often oscillate between endorsement and
ambivalence on the issues of democracy and human rights, but with growing acceptance of
new political realities; small, but strong and active Christian communities continue to shape
the debates within the church defending the compatibility between Orthodoxy and
democracy.23
The Synod has adopted declarations and encyclicals on significant moral-political issues.
In its positions, the Synod has advised legislators and the government to change provisions in
the draft bills of the Denominations Act, Family Code, Education Act, Protection of the Child
Act, as well as to express positions in relation to issues of religious education in public
schools, ‘in vitro’ fertilization, migration, and refugees. Not all of these statements have been
positively accepted in the wider civil society and the media. Nevertheless, the Church has
defended its public role and engagement, thus becoming one of the important players in the

public debates. These positions sometimes have challenged the established popular views
(e.g. on the issues of bioethics); on other cases they have relied on constitutional arguments
and human rights justification.24
In 2013, in the official statements of the Patriarch and the Holy Synod during the mass
demonstrations and protest movements against the corrupt political elite and the oligarchy,
some democratic political ideas were also endorsed–-the right to live under a just political
Ina Merdjanova, “Women, Orthodox Christianity and Neo-Secularization in Bulgaria,” in Merdjanova, Ina
(ed.), Women and Religiosity in Orthodox Christian Contexts (forthcoming with Fordham University Press,
2021).
23
Atanas Slavov. Between Endorsement and Ambivalence: Democracy and Eastern Orthodoxy in PostCommunist South East Europe, CAS Working Paper Series No. 7/2015: Sofia 2015. Available at:
http://www.cas.bg/uploads/files/WPS-APP-7/Slavov,%20Atanas.pdf
24
Encyclicals of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church – Bulgarian Patriarchate:
http://www.bg-patriarshia.bg/index.php?file=appeal.xml
22
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order and limited and accountable government, the idea of the popular consent for the
government, the right to protest against an unjust and arbitrary rule, and rights defending the
value of religious and ethnic tolerance. Even before that, in 2011, the Synod issued a
declaration emphasizing that the principle of justice originates from God and it demands a
just punishment for committed crimes, and that the state should be responsible for the
administration of justice. The Synod defended the principle that in cases when the just
political order is not guaranteed, the people have the right of resistance against an unjust rule.
Moreover, the basic forms of social justice and solidarity have to be guaranteed for every
citizen and each group in society; otherwise it is legitimate for them to seek recourse in the
right of resistance. According to the Synod, the principles of justice and solidarity are the
fundament of the state and should be implemented by the government.25
This internal drive in the BOC towards receiving official status could be seen as deeply
encoded in the more traditional model of church state relations. The new public role of the
BOC in its relation to the state could be interpreted as a revitalization of the traditional

Orthodox political-theological concept of symphonia, stripped from its imperial context and
encapsulated in the modern nation-states in the Southeastern Europe.26 Thus, the doctrine of
establishing and protecting the “Christian nation,” in each of the nation-states in the region,
emerged as a synthesis between the religious-political legacy (of the emerging new nations
from the 19 century onwards emancipating form the over-powerful Ecumenical Patriarchate
and fighting for independence from the Ottoman Empire) and the new political realities of
sovereign nation-states.27 The political and cultural boundaries of the nations coincided with
those of the national Orthodox churches.28
The case of the Church engagement with symphonia and “Christian nation” concepts
could be illustrated with a decision of the Synod in April 2015. The Church decided to
include, in the text of the religious services, an invocation of the name of the former
Bulgarian king (1943-1946)–Simeon II (Saxe-Coburg-Gotha) with the styling ‘the devout
and Christ-loving Tsar of the Bulgarians Simeon.’ Moreover, this formula was included in
25

Послание на св. Синод на БПЦ за мир и народно единство (Encyclical of the Holy Synod of the
Bulgarian Orthodox Church for Peace and Unity of the People), 29 September 2011: http://dveri.bg/a8 (visited
12.05.2020).
26
Victor Roudometoff, Globalization and Orthodox Christianity. The Transformations of a Religious Tradition
(Oxford: Routledge, 2014), pp. 79-101.
27
Andrew Louth, ‘Ignatios or Eusebios: Two Models of Patristic Ecclesiology’ (2010) 10 International Journal
of the Study of the Christian Church 1, pp. 46-56.
28
John Meyendorff, The Byzantine Legacy in the Orthodox Church (New York: St Vladimir's Seminary
Press,1983), pp. 225-229.
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the liturgical text before the traditional blessing prayer for the government and the people,
thus receiving liturgical precedence. 29 This decision provoked immediate critical reaction
among active groups of lay members of the church and some members of the clergy, being
interpreted as a sign of the Church’s involvement in politics and as an act in collusion with
the established republican constitutional order. It is noteworthy that there was no proper and
adequate justification of this synodal decision. It would have been seen as more appropriate if
Bulgaria was still a monarchy in which Orthodoxy enjoyed the status of an official state
religion. It is widely considered unacceptable, however, that in a constitutional republic
which does not recognize monarchic and aristocratic ranks, likewise in which the church is
separated from the state, that it would simultaneously and officially accept the democratic
constitutional order. Thus, after the active public opposition to the decision, it was not
implemented in practice. This case also indicates that many members of the high clergy and
the Holy Synod still endorse the traditional symphonia model intertwined with the nationalist
ideology, failing to fully appreciate the contemporary democratic and republican model.

There is also a positive sign: the immediate critical reflection on behalf of the laity and civil
society shows that within the church, there are communities who openly endorse modern
democratic constitutional order.
One of the recent public debates the Church took part in involved human rights
arguments on the one side (some government institutions and active NGOs), and preservation
of the so called “traditional values” on the other (the Orthodox Church, Protestant
denominations and alliances, nationalist-populist and far-right political parties including
members of the government majority coalition). The case concerned the failed ratification of
a key Council of Europe human rights instrument, a convention on preventing and combating
violence against women and domestic violence (Istanbul Convention). The Church arguments
against the Convention were in fact completely detached from its authentic legal meaning and
official objectives formulated in the text.30 Rather, the Church fought a media-constructed
fake image which presented this human rights instrument as introducing “same-sex marriage”
and a “third sex,” as introducing “gender ideology” that would erode traditional family values
and more generally Christian values in society. The government sided with the Church and
29

Bulgarian Patriarchate, Decision of the Holy Synod for invocation of Simeon II, Tsar of the Bulgarians in
religious services, 29.04.2015: http://www.bg-patriarshia.bg/news.php?id=172424 (7.08.2015).
30

Становище на Светия Синод по повод Истанбулската конвенция (Opinion of the Holy Synod regarding
the Istanbul Convention), 22 January, 2018: https://bg-patriarshia.bg/news.php?id=254101 (visited 12.05.2020).
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requested a preliminary interpretive ruling by the Constitutional Court prior to ratification.
The public and political debate was foreclosed after the official ruling of Constitutional Court
stipulating that some provisions from the Conventions (e.g. legal definitions of gender and its
incorrect translation in Bulgaria) collided with the principle of the rule of law and legal
certainty.31 Hence, the parliament is not allowed to ratify the Convention.
Meanwhile, the government also increased its support for the Church by allocating public
funds for reconstruction and restoration of churches, inviting the Patriarch and the high
clergy to participate in public events and commemorations beyond the strictly religious
ceremonies (especially national and/or official holidays, such as Liberation Day, on 3rd
March, St. George’s Day on 6th May, the Day of the Slavic Bulgarian Alphabet on 24th May,
etc.). The official ceremony and protocol of assuming public office is often practiced in the
presence of the high clergy who bless the newly elected officials. (This is applied in various
situations, from opening of the first session of the newly elected National Assembly, to the
election of new government, and an inauguration ceremony for the new president assuming

office; on a lower level, the same applies for the regional governors, mayors, city councils,
etc. Additionally, under the State Protocol Act and the implementation regulation (Art. 87), in
the order of formal precedence, the Patriarch enjoys the fifth position immediately after the
president, the speaker of parliament, the prime-minister, and the vice-president, thus being
treated ceremonially as a high level official, while official representatives of other religious
denominations receive 28th place (of 29).
Further, the public visibility of the Church has increased as an aftermath of the
engagement of a growing community of Christian intellectuals, academics, civic leaders with
contemporary political and social issues. They participate in the public debates regarding the
role of Eastern Orthodoxy and the Church in the society. The majority of this group embraces
democratic values and principles and is closely associated with the modernization and
democratization project of the country, including deepening the Euro-Atlantic cooperation
and integration. Some of these intellectuals are involved in the publication of the academic
journal Christianity and Culture 32 or participate as frequent contributors, others are very

31

The Constitutional Court, Decision № 13 of 27 July 2018:
http://www.constcourt.bg/bg/Acts/GetHtmlContent/f278a156-9d25-412d-a064-6ffd6f997310
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Christianity and Culture (issued by Communitas Foundation): http://www.hkultura.com/
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active in Orthodox Christian online platforms and portals such as Двери на Православието
(Dveri na Pravoslavieto).33
As an official recognition of the changed dynamic of church-state relations is the 2018
and 2019 amendments in the 2002 Denominations Act, which provide for increased public
funding of the two major religious communities, the Bulgarian Orthodox Church and the
Muslim community. In principle, this type of public funding is open for each religious
community that meets the requirement that at least 1% of the population self-identifies as
belonging to the specific denomination in order to receive the funds.34 However, it was clear
from the beginning that only the Orthodox Church and the Muslim community can qualify
and receive larger funds (10 Bulgarian leva, or 5 EUR, per member). Funds allocated by the
state budget include salaries of the clergy, salaries of other servants in the religious institution
and funding for (re) construction and restoration of religious buildings. In practice, these
provisions provide preferential treatment for the largest religious communities, offering tens
of millions in tax-payer money. According to the 2020 State Budget Act, the Bulgarian

Patriarchate will receive 26 million leva and the major Muslim community will receive
approx. 6 million. Only limited funds are available for the rest of the denominations (the
Catholic Church 70,000, Protestant denominations 160,000, Jewish community 70,000).35
One of the problems with this allocation of public funds is that it relies on the data provided
by the national statistics (2011 national census), not on real number of practicing believers.
From this approach the two major religious communities benefit most. It is well established
that self-identification as Orthodox Christian has more to do with ethno-national and cultural
identity than with regular religious practice and observance of rituals. Thus, less than 10% of
people who identify as Orthodox Christians in the country engage in real religious practice,
while the Church receive budget funds for the total number. It is quite different from the
Catholics and Protestants, who publicly share their religious identity only if they are
practicing and feel connected to the religious community. Yet another problem of this
allocation is that Protestant denominations are not unified under a single governing body:
they belong to different doctrinal traditions, but receive the public funds as a whole (under
the budget law).

33

http://dveri.bg
The last national census was in 2011, there is forthcoming in 2021.
35
2020 State Budget Act: https://dv.parliament.bg/DVWeb/showMaterialDV.jsp?idMat=143562
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In a nutshell, under the law, the government has increased its control and oversight in the
process of allocation of funds which should be administered by the Directorate of Religious
Affairs (Council of Ministers). This development, however, was welcomed by the Church
itself, and was interpreted in terms of good cooperation, real commitment and care on behalf
of the government. In fact, both sides–the Church and the state–look at this new framework
as a mutually benefiting scheme; the privileged position of the Church in society is ensured,
along with continuing support to the government and public blessing of its activities on
behalf of the Church. Publicly expressed fears by some Orthodox intellectuals and lay
religious groups state that this may lead to the politicization of the Church. They fear its
transformation into a semi-governmental department of religious services are not addressed
either from the ecclesiastical governing bodies, or from the governmental offices.
The last example of the privileged treatment of the BOC by the state relates to the
restrictive measures imposed by the government and sanitary authorities in order to contain
the COVID-19 pandemic. On March 13, 2020, the Bulgarian parliament, on the proposal by

the Council of Ministers, adopted a state of emergency decision (a constitutionally grounded
form of a state of exception). This happened for the first time in the last 30 years of
democratic politics. A week later, on March 20th, the parliament adopted a new emergency
law that stipulated specific measures and policies that will be exercised in order to preserve
the functioning of key institutions during the pandemic and ensure adequate and timely
sanitary measures. Based on this legal framework, the minister of health issued orders that
introduced measures of social distancing, banned certain economic activities, and imposed
some restrictions on the freedom of assembly and freedom of movement.36 Adults were not
allowed to gather freely even on the streets or public parks (which were closed), with the
exception of having up to two adults together with social distancing (two meters). In line with
these rules, almost all of the religious organizations in the country decided to close their
worship places entirely or allow only private prayers or on-line broadcasted religious services
without participation of the lay people; not the Bulgarian church, however. During the entire
Lenten period (eight weeks of fasting and intensive worship before Easter), which coincided
with the peak of the pandemic, the Orthodox churches remained not only open for the laity

for private prayer, but also allowed all religious services with the participation of the lay
people. There were several attempts on behalf of the government and the sanitary authorities
36

Ministry of Health, Order # RD-01-124/13.03.2020; Order # RD-01-131/17.03.2020:
https://www.mh.government.bg/media/filer_public/2020/03/17/rd-01-131_doplva_zapoved__rd-01-124.pdf
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to change this position. After an official meeting held by the members of the Holy Synod and
representatives of the government (the deputy prime-minister, the chairman of the national
crisis staff, and the director of Directorate of Religious Affairs) only limited sanitary
measures were agreed upon (wearing of face masks in the churches, regular sanitation and
disinfection in churches, only very few services to be celebrated in front of the churches
during the most intensive worship hours, limiting communion sacrament only to people who
have personal connection to the parish and are well-known to the parish priests). 37 In a
further attempt to request the Synod to apply stricter sanitary measures and to limit
participation of lay people in worship (to avoid public gathering as required by the general
rules), another meeting with the Synod was convened, attended by the prime-minister,
minister of health, and the director of Directorate of Religious Affairs.38 Nevertheless, the
Synod did not agree to implement such stricter measures. This approach was unlike Greece or
other Orthodox jurisdictions which implemented very restrictive polices concerning religious
services, either closing churches for public worship, or allowing only online streaming of

services celebrated only by the clergy (lay people absent).39 This latter case is illustrative of
the privileged position of the Church which succeeded to place itself above legitimate and
mandatory rules and decisions issued by the government in order to prevent and contain the
pandemic in time of national emergency. Only the Orthodox Church enjoyed preferential
treatment that was refused to other denominations. When the Church is concerned, general
rules and orders issued by the government do not apply.
The current situation of close church-state cooperation raises even more profound
questions related to the quality of democratization in the country. Given the continuing
erosion of democratic standards and the rule of law, Bulgaria remains at the bottom among
the EU countries when democratic consolidation and the rule of law are considered.40 The
37
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close ties between the Church leadership and the incumbent government are often used for
legitimation of power in the eyes of the wider public. Though the intensive cooperation
between the Church and the state is often interpreted in terms of mutual benefit, serious
doubts remain whether this is beneficial for the believers and citizens of the country at large.
The general impression remains that these are negotiated benefits in the sole interest of the
powerholders.

Conclusion
In the last decades of democratization, though the quality of democratic process
remains low, there are several developments regarding to the legal status of the Bulgarian
Orthodox Church. First, after the fall of the communist atheist regime, the Church enjoyed
the right of free practice of its rituals, increasing its public presence, and engaging with
missionary and charity work. These opportunities, however, were not fully realized, due to
the internal church divisions, which weakened its role in society and eroded the public trust.

Nonetheless, the traditional religion status of the Eastern Orthodoxy was constitutionally
recognized since the beginning of the period of the 1991 Constitution. Second, after
overcoming of the internal schismatic movement with the assistance of the state in the early
2000s, the Church is gradually increasing its public influence and attracting more public
support, increasing social trust, while at the same time, the society remains deeply
secularized, and the number of regularly practicing Orthodox Christians has not increased
significantly (constantly remaining below 10 % of the believers). In 2002, with the adoption
of new Denominations Act, the Bulgarian Patriarchate received ex lege recognition and
privileged legal status, thus supporting its position during internal church struggles and
enhancing its role vis-a-vis the state and society. After overcoming the schism with the aid of
the government, the Church entered a period of increased public presence with the
opportunity to influence the legislative process and governmental decisions, while receiving
constant support on behalf of the state on many different occasions (from public funding for
construction and reconstruction of churches, to taking into account many synodical opinions
on legislation and different policies). Third, the privileged legal status of the Church has been

further enhanced with the 2019 legislation which provides public funding for paying the
salaries of all the clergy and other church servants, along with providing sufficient funding
Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2020 Report, Bulgaria: https://freedomhouse.org/country/bulgaria/nationstransit/2020
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for construction and maintaining of church buildings. The privileged position of the Orthodox
Church is even more visible now, when in times of strict measures addressing the COVID-19
pandemic, in the midst of constitutional state of officially declared emergency, the Church
alone among all other religious communities has been allowed to celebrate all its feasts and
rituals with the participation of the laity. All facts and developments interpreted
simultaneously, taking into account gradual changes in law and the raising public influence
of the Church, lead to the conclusion that the public status of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church
is elevated to that of official religion, compared to the more moderate traditional religion
status constitutionally mandated in the beginning of the period.
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